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Abstract
Hereditary leadership has been an important feature of the political landscape throughout
history. This paper argues that hereditary leadership is like a relational contract which improves
policy incentives. We assemble a unique dataset on leaders between 1874 and 2004 in which
we classify them as hereditary leaders based on their family history. The core empirical nd-
ing is that economic growth is higher in polities with hereditary leaders but only if executive
constraints are weak. Moreover, this holds across of a range of specications. The nding
is also mirrored in policy outcomes which a¤ect growth. In addition, we nd that hereditary
leadership is more likely to come to an end when the growth performance under the incumbent
leader is poor.
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There are many ways to wish a king well; but the kings subjects, .. have more
reason to be sincere when they say "long live the king." If the king anticipates and
values dynastic succession, that further lengthens the planning horizon and is good for
his subjects.(Mancur Olson, 1993 page 571).
To the evil of monarchy we have added that of hereditary succession; and as the rst
is a degradation and lessening of ourselves, so the second, claimed as a matter of right, is
an insult and imposition on posterity.(Thomas Paine, 1776)
1 Introduction
Over the sweep of human history, some form of autocratic rule has been the normal state of a¤airs.
Only in the past two hundred years have alternatives cemented themselves in which leaders are subject
to formal contests for power and subject to executive constraints imposed by independent courts
and legislatures. Hereditary rule in the form of monarchy or dynastic dictatorship are important
examples of autocratic rule. Moreover, throughout history, the utility of hereditary rule has been
much debated. Olson (1993), as the quote above illustrates, argued that hereditary rule could create
an incentive for good governance. But others, most notably Paine (1776) who is also quoted, argued
strongly against it as a form of government.
This paper uses a new and unique data set to look at the consequences of hereditary rule among
leaders who were in power between 1874 and 2004. We test a specic theoretical prediction based
on a simple agency model whose key insight is that the correlation between having an hereditary
leader in power and economic performance should di¤er depending on whether executive constraints
which limit incumbent discretion are in place. Consistent with this prediction, we nd that growth is
indeed stronger in countries with hereditary leaders only if executive constraints are weak. However,
with strong executive constraints in place, there is no growth dividend from having an hereditary
leader in o¢ ce. This corroborates the idea that strong executive constraints do indeed serve as
an alternative to dynastic reputation formation as a means of controlling leaders. The sign and
signicance of the core correlation that we uncover is robust to wide range of specications.
The argument that we develop to motivate a role for hereditary rule exploits the insights from
classic political agency models such as that of Barro (1973).1 The core idea in that literature is
that leader reputationscan be used to control moral hazard problems in politics. This parallels
the arguments in the extensive literature on relational contracts in industrial organization (see, for
example, Malcomson, 2013). In a political economy setting, Myerson (2008, 2010) has developed
similar theoretical arguments and formalizes the notion that political leadership is held in trust with
the control of moral hazard being central to good leadership. He also emphasizes the role of a
selectorate in enforcing implicit contractsforged between citizens and leaders by controlling access
1See Besley (2006) for a review of the political agency literature.
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to power.
The paper is also related to an emerging literature on political dynasties. Blood ties between
politicians of di¤erent generations are common in both autocratic and democratic systems. In the
data introduced below, we nd that 6.4% of all leaders since the mid-nineteenth century have come
from a hereditary dynasty; this percentage falls to 3.1% in democracies.2 Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder
(2009) document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and prole of political dynasties in
the U.S. since 1789. Using a regression discontinuity design, they argue that dynastic political power
is self-perpetuating with a positive exogenous shock to a persons political power having persistent
e¤ects on holding political power. Querubin (2010) looks at political dynasties in the Philippines
using a similar approach and nds an even stronger e¤ect of a political advantage through a family
connection on holding power. Querubin (2011) nds that there is no e¤ect of introducing a term
limit on the persistence of family power.
Interest in hereditary rule is part of a wider interest in the role of elites in acquiring and main-
taining political power in di¤erent settings. Perhaps the most famous statement on this issue is
the celebrated work by Mosca (1939) and Pareto (1901). Tullock (1987) argued that hereditary
transitions of power were part of a wider strategy for sustaining elite control in autocracies since it
provides a means of insulating the elite from potentially destabilizing power struggles. Brownlee
(2007) studies transitions of power in a sample of 258 post-war autocratic leaders who rule for at
least three years. He argues that hereditary succession tends to be accepted by ruling elites when
there are no formal party structures to regulate transitions of power.
The paper raises similar issues to those discussed in the extensive literature on dynastic control in
rms and whether rms su¤er from being controlled by family members see, for example, Benedsen
et al. (2007), Bloom and VanReenen (2007), Burkhart et al. (2003). These studies have tended to
nd that family-owned businesses perform worse than other rms. However, we are not aware of
studies that have investigated whether there is heterogeneity in the performance of family-run rms
depending on the governance arrangements in place, for example di¤erences in the power of outside
investors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the
data and explore some background facts about hereditary rule in the raw data. Here, we contrast the
personal characteristics of hereditary and non-hereditary rule. Section three discusses the theoretical
framework which motivates a specic test and underpins the interpretation of the empirical ndings.
Section four presents some evidence on how hereditary leaders a¤ect policy and growth. It also
shows that low growth increases the chances of hereditary leadership coming to an end. Section ve
concludes.3
2This increases to 9% and 11% respectively if we use a broader denition of dynastic leader.
3An on-line Appendix contains some additional results.
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2 Background Facts
The empirical results in the paper are based on a new data set on world leaders and their background
characteristics that we have put together. To identify the leader in each country and year, we use
the Archigos dataset which covers the period between 1874 and 2004.4 To this, we add measures
to capture the family political connections of the head of the state. A leader is classied as being
hereditary if they had either a parent or grandparent who had also been head of state. For each
leader, we have also assembled a wider picture of family connections, which we will use as a robustness
check. This uses information on whether a leaders parents, grandparents, uncle, brother, cousin,
spouse, or brother-in-law has held a political position where the latter is dened to include high o¢ ce
holders such as being a Prime Minister, President or King along with lesser positions such as being
a Member of Parliament or Mayor. In a small number of cases, we also a leaders relationship to
Clan Chiefs, Religious Leaders or Samurai.
This information comes mainly from the Encyclopedia of Heads of States and Governments,
Oxford Political Biography: Who is Who in the Twentieth Century World Politics, Encyclopedia
Britannica, other online sources, and biographies contained in Lexis-Nexis. Using these sources, we
obtain a core sample of leaders in 197 countries between 1874 and 2004 out of a potential sample of
227 countries. Picking one leader per year this gives us a total of 2097 leaders, and a total of 2484
leader-spells in o¢ ce.5
We nd that 6.4% of the leaders in our sample are classied as hereditary according to our core
denition. We begin by looking at the prevalence of hereditary leaders and how it has changed over
time. Hereditary leadership has been in decline in countries that were already independent before
1900; around 8.3% of leaders between 1874 and 1900 are classied as being hereditary compared to
4.2% for the period between 1950 and 2004.6 Among newer countries, i.e. those which appear in
the dataset later than 1900, around 7.7% have hereditary leaders. There is no signicant correlation
between the year in which a leader comes to power and whether he is classied as being hereditary.7
4Archigos has two datasets: one which gives information on leader, year and country, and one which gives infor-
mation only on leader and country. In the latter there are 95 leader-country observations that do not appear in the
former. In our analysis, we include these 95 observations which are for the following countries: Barbados, Bahamas,
Belize, Brunei, Cape Verde, Iceland, Luxemburg, Maldives, Malta, Montenegro, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Tiber,
Transvaal, Zanzibar. We extend the data back to 1848 for a few countries. Many countries have more than one head
of state. The Archigos dataset identies the actual e¤ective ruler based on a judgement about the particularities of
each country. Two rules are generally followed: (i) in Parliamentary regimes, the prime minister is coded as the ruler,
while in Presidential systems it is the president; (ii) in communist states the Chairman of the Party is coded as the
e¤ective ruler.
5In cases where more than one leader is in o¢ ce in a given year, we focus on the leader who has been in o¢ ce for
the longest time period during the year.
6This broadly similar to the ndings for the U.S Congress where Dal Bo et al (2009) nd that the 8.7% of new
entrants have a previous political connection using data between 1789 and 1996. They also nd that this proportion
has not fallen much over time.
7It is interesting to relate whether a politician is dynastic to opportunities to replace leaders as captured by three
PolityIV variables: (i) the extent of institutionalization  or regulation  of executive transfers (XRREG), (ii) the
competitiveness of executive selection (XRCOMP), and (iii) the openness of executive recruitment (XROPEN). This
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The strength of executive constraints plays a key role in the theoretical framework and our core
measure of this comes from the Polity IV database. We use the variable xconst which captures
how leaders are bound by institutional constraints on a scale between 1 and 7. Limits on the chief
executive may, for example, be imposed by any accountability group in the polity. In many
democracies these constraints are imposed by the legislative and judicial branches of government.
Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party system, a council of nobles
or powerful advisors in monarchies, and the military in coup-prone polities. We classify a country as
having strong executive constraints using a dummy variable which is equal to one if xconst is equal
to 7, the highest possible score. The fraction of leaders who are hereditary is 8.8% in weak executive
constraints countries and 3.3% in those countries with strong executive constraints.
Table 1 uses data from Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) to look at some characteristics of heredi-
tary and non-hereditary leaders; we also disaggregate this according to whether executive constraints
are strong or weak. Hereditary leaders are less educated, being less likely to have a college degree
and graduate qualication. This is mainly driven by those who take o¢ ce in countries when exec-
utive constraints are weak. In countries with strong executive constraints, hereditary leaders are
more likely to have studied abroad. Hereditary leaders come to o¢ ce on average when they are
younger (42 years old versus 53) and they also tend to serve for longer in o¢ ce, 11.5 years in o¢ ce
compared to 5 for non-hereditary leaders. This corroborates Olsons idea that hereditary leaders
may have longer time horizons. This di¤erence in tenure is largest for those leaders who take o¢ ce
when executive constraints are weak. Table 1 also shows that hereditary leaders are more likely to
have served in the military, are less likely to have been elected, and unsurprisingly, are more likely to
belong to royal families. In terms of careers, hereditary leaders are less likely than non-hereditary
leaders to have had careers as lawyers, professors/scientists and are also less likely to come from a
business background.
In our sample of leaders, 46% of leader spells fall under strong executive constraints. This
increases modestly over our sample period from around 40% in the nineteenth century to a little
over 50% for the last twenty-ve years of the sample. This reects the fact that countries that enter
our database in later years tend not to have strong executive constraints. Indeed, the proportion
of countries in our sample with strong executive constraints falls in the period after World War II
compared to the inter-war period.
Figure 1 further illustrates the time-series pattern of hereditary leadership in our data. The red
line is drawn for all leaders and shows a general downward trend. However, once again, it should be
borne in mind that there is a change over time in the sample of countries represented in this gure
as more independent countries enter the dataset. The green and blue lines show the trend over
summary variable takes values between 1 and 8, with 8 being the most open and competitive method of selection.
This variable is strongly correlated with our measure of whether a politician belongs to a political dynasty. Around
3% of leaders are from dynasties in the political systems where the value of this dummy variable is 8 compared to 10%
for the sample where the value of this variable is less than 8.
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time for countries that have weak and strong executive constraints respectively. At the beginning of
the sample period, there are more hereditary leaders in countries with strong executive constraints.
However, this pattern is reversed by the end of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth
century, there are fewer hereditary leaders in countries with strong executive constraints.
Finally, we look at some raw facts about growth. Table 2 compares the average growth perfor-
mance in countries depending on whether the country has a hereditary leader and whether it has
strong or weak executive constraints. A clear pattern emerges with growth being lowest when there
is neither a hereditary leader nor strong executive constraints, in which case the average growth rate
is 0.89%. This contrasts with a growth rate of around 2% for all other combinations of executive
constraints and hereditary rule. Moreover, an F-test (F=4.42, p-value 0.03) reveals that we can
reject the null hypothesis that the mean growth rates are equal for the sample of hereditary and
non-hereditary leaders in countries with weak executive constraints. Also, we cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that the average growth rates are the same when we compare countries with and without
hereditary leaders among those with strong executive constraints (F-test (F=0.86, p-value 0.35)).
3 Theory
In this section, we develop a model where hereditary rule emerges as a political equilibrium in the
spirit of Olson (1993) and induces better performance from leaders who care that their o¤spring will
follow them in o¢ ce. We show that this is valuable to whomever maintains the leader in power only
if executive constraints are unable solve moral hazard problems in government.8
Policy Making and Institutions Time is innite and each period is denoted by t. Citizens are
innitely lived and in period t have a payo¤, ut, which depends two things (i) policy t 2 f0;g
where  > 0 and (ii) the leaders popularity at 2 f A;Ag where A > 0, i.e.
ut = t + at
The policy payo¤ depends on a binary policy choice et 2 f0; 1g. For the sake of concreteness, think
of this as making a decision which a¤ects the enforcement of property rights or a decision to invest
in worthwhile infrastructure. In each period nature determines a state of the world, st 2 f0; 1g
and t =  if and only et = st. We assume that both states are equally likely and that generating
a payo¤ t =  requires a leader to incur a private cost of c.
The popularity component of citizenspayo¤s is a attached to a specic leader. Ex ante, we
assume that a randomly selected leader is popular with probability . Let A () = [2  1]A be the
expected popularity of a randomly chosen leader.
8See Besley and Mueller (2015) for a model along these lines.
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Leaders are drawn from a countably innite pool of families denoted by f = 1; :::: . Each leader
lives for only one period and has a single o¤spring. To create a dynastic motive, we suppose that
there is payo¤ of B if an incumbents o¤spring succeeds him/her. For simplicity, we suppose that
this payo¤ is like a warm-glowbequest which is independent of the actual value of holding o¢ ce.
We also assume that B > c, so that an incumbent leader would, in principle, be willing to generate
a payo¤ of  for the citizens if having his o¤spring succeed him is made conditional on this.
We consider two institutional possibilities. With strong executive constraints, we assume that
et = st is ensured so that citizens always get t = . We have in mind having an e¤ective legislator
which is able to forcethe leader to act in the interests of citizens. A perfect constraint is of course,
the most extreme assumption, but having this happen probabilistically would yield broadly similar
results. With weak executive constraints, the incumbent has full discretion over the choice et. We
expect et = st only if it is in the leaders private interest to do so.
Retention and Selection The retention of leaders lies in the hands of a sub-group of citizens (the
selectorate). The term selectorate, coined by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) could represent a
variety of institutional settings. In democracies retention decisions rest with voters although party
elites and insiders can also play an important role in who stands for o¢ ce. In non-democracies the
selectorate could comprise senior army o¢ cers in military dictatorships or inuential aristocrats in
monarchies. They could also be members of a party hierarchy as in a communist system like in
China. Members of the selectorate decide whether to select the policy maker from the ruling family
or to install a new ruling family. An hereditary dynasty is created when the selectorate chooses the
o¤spring of the incumbent to take power. We suppose that the selectorate has a discount factor
 < 1 and that they observe the popularity of the leaders o¤spring before deciding whether to
appoint him/her as leader.
Timing The timing of the model with each period t is as follows:
1. There is an incumbent leader in o¢ ce for t  1.
2. Nature determines the popularity of the leaders o¤spring a^t 1 2 f A;Ag.
3. The selectorate chooses between the leaders o¤spring and picking a new ruling family from the
available pool.
4. If the incumbents o¤spring is maintained then at = a^t 1. Otherwise at = A with probability
.
5. Nature chooses st:
6. The incumbent leader chooses et 2 f0; 1g
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7. Payo¤s are realized.
We will look for a stationary sub-game perfect equilibrium of the model where the selectorate and
incumbents optimize in their policy and retention decisions.
3.1 Equilibrium
We rst show what happens with strong executive constraints. The main analysis is for the case
of at weak executive constraints where we focus on two possible equilibria. In the rst of these,
only popular incumbents are retained and incumbents never produce good policy. In the second,
an hereditary dynasty emerges where the leaders o¤spring is retained whether or not she is popular
provided that her predecessor has generated  while in o¢ ce.
Strong Executive Constraints With strong executive constraints, et = st always by assumption.
Then popularity is all that matters to the selectorate. Since this is observed before appointing the
o¤spring then only popular o¤spring are appointed since A > A (). Thus, consistent with the data,
hereditary rule is possible even with strong executive constraints. However, this will happen purely
on the basis of popularity rather than performance in o¢ ce. More generally, we expect hereditary
leadership to emerge only if there is indeed an information advantage about popularity for dynasties.
Weak Executive Constraints We begin with the following benchmark result where hereditary
succession plays no role. The following result is proven in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 There is always an equilibrium where only popular incumbents are retained and et 6=
st for all t.
The logic is straightforward. Since all incumbents set et 6= st, then only popularity matters to the
selectorate. Hence if the leaders o¤spring is popular, she will be chosen otherwise it is worthwhile
picking a fresh family from the pool of potential rulers. Since incumbents believe that retention is
only popularity-based, it is never worthwhile for the leader to set et = st since doing is costly.
This equilibrium is the mirror image of strong executive constraints case except for the policy
performance of the leader. The frequency of incumbent turnover is driven purely by , the probability
that an incumbents o¤spring is popular and we expect a dynastic leader to emerge with equal
frequency in this equilibrium regardless of whether executive constraints are strong or weak. This
equilibrium exists for all parameter values since it only relies on the the out of equilibrium belief that
any leader who deviates to et = st will not thereby bequeath the leadership to their o¤spring.
We now consider a di¤erent equilibrium in which the o¤spring of all incumbents are retained under
weak executive constraints regardless of their popularity as long as their predecessor has produced a
good policy outcome for the citizens. The following Proposition, whose proof is in the Appendix,
gives su¢ cient conditions for this to emerge:
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Proposition 2 Suppose that   2 [1  ]A and (1  )B > c; then there is an equilibrium in
which the o¤spring of all incumbents are retained and et = st in each period.
This kind of equilibrium can emerge as long as the incumbent believes that his o¤spring will be
appointed as leader after she has paid c to generate  for the citizens. This requires that A be small
enough and/or  is large enough so that the selectorate are willing to pick an unpopular leader when
they believe that the dynastic equilibrium will break down if they fail to appoint the next member
of the dynasty. This equilibrium also requires that the bequest motive be strong enough so make
paying the cost c worthwhile. The condition for hereditary rule to be an equilibrium depends on .
It is hardest to satisfy when  is close to one since it is highly likely that the unpopular o¤spring of
a leader will be replaced by a popular leader if she is not allowed to succeed her parent.
This equilibrium can be thought of as a relational contract between the dynasty in power and the
selectorate along the lines envisaged in the opening quote from Olson (1993). The hereditary dynasty
delivers good policy outcomes in exchange for an assurance that unpopular members of the dynasty
are selected to hold o¢ ce conditional on their predecessor having set et = st. This is supported by
the belief that if the hereditary system were to break down (specically if an unpopular member of
the dynasty were removed) then a non-hereditary equilibrium would follow in which all subsequent
incumbents perform poorly and only their popular o¤spring are retained. Thus, our equilibrium
illustrates the idea that hereditary rule arises not out of intrinsic popularity but because incumbents
who are part of the dynasty perform well.
Although we have applied this idea to a hereditary system, this could also be a model of a long-
lived party system like the communist party in China where economic growth is exchanged for
continuity in power regardless of whether leaders are intrinsically popular. This is a focal point
of the system which creates political stability and good economic performance. Such systems only
make sense in a setting of weak executive constraints, like China, where there are no direct means of
enforcing good policy.
Predictions Proposition 2 gives conditions for there to be an equilibrium with good policy without
strong executive constraints. Thus citizens can get good policy (et = st) in two cases: (i) if there
are strong executive constraints and (ii) if there is a hereditary equilibrium under weak executive
constraints. There will be bad policy outcomes (with et 6= st) for citizens when then is no hereditary
equilibrium with weak executive constraints.
Since there can be multiple equilibria, the model does not fully explain how some polities can
coordinate on hereditary equilibria. For the core empirical results, we suppose that this coordination
is uncorrelated with factors which shape economic performance. Neither does the model explain
why all polities do not choose to have strong executive constraints, particularly those which cannot
organize hereditary equilibria. This could be explained by adding additional features to the model by
which bad policies generate rents for some agents who therefore have a vested interest in maintaining
9
bad government.9
Comments on the Model The model that we have presented is deliberately simple in order to
focus on the nature of the exchange between the selectorate and the leaders. It could be complicated
in a variety of ways which would make it more realistic while retaining the essence of the argument
that we have developed for why hereditary rule can improve performance. For example, the as-
sumption that strong executive constraints always improve performance is not needed for the broad
thrust of the prediction to hold that strong executive constraints only improve things under weak
executive constraints. To see this, suppose that under strong executive constraints, then et = st
with probability . Then the expected policy payo¤ of voters is . It is still optimal in this world
to select solely on the basis of popularity with strong constraints. The two equilibria described in
Propositions 1 and 2 continue to exist. While the non-dynastic equilibrium of Proposition 1 is less
good for voters than strong executive constraints, the dynastic equilibrium now out-performs strong
executive constraints.10
We could also introduce an element of selection into the model whereby some leaders are more
or less competent with growth providing a signal of competence. If competence is transmitted
intergenerationally, this would provide an additional argument for hereditary selection.
The model has focused exclusively on an upside of dynastic rule. But dynastic rule could result
in self-enrichment via violation of property rights. Absolutist monarchs in history were famous for
seizing land and property. The scope for doing this without facing opposition would be larger if
hereditary rules also generate other benets of the kind highlighted in Proposition 2. The bequest
motive, represented by B would likely be higher where rents accruing to leaders are larger as in the
model of Myerson (2010). If rent extraction which creates these returns is also ine¢ cient, this would
weaken the value of hereditary rule. In the end, it will therefore be an empirical question whether
such cases of hereditary rule are good or bad for growth.
The model has focused on hereditary rather than dynastic selection in general. However, similar
theoretical forces could also explain how families/clans could develop reputations which would be
relevant in periodic contests for power. This would depend on the selectorate using the history
of all past members of a dynasty and factoring this into their decisions and could explain period
re-emergence of members of dynasties.11
Growth Implications We will apply the ideas above to aggregate measures of economic per-
formance when specic leaders are in power. We shall suppose that the realization t a¤ects
9See Besley et al (2016) for discussion of theory and evidence on selecting strong execitive constraints.
10That said, if  gets low enough so that executive constraints are highly ine¤ective, then it is possible that a
dynastic equilibrium could emerge even when there are strong executive constraints.
11The on-line Appendix shows that dynastic leadership is reinforced by natural disasters suggesting that there are
times when citizens crave familiarity among their leadership.
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productivity so that aggregate output, Yt, is given by the production function:
Yt = e
t

K1 t L


where productivity depends on policy: t = [1 + t] t 1 and there is a xed supply of labor, L. We
shall suppose that aggregate capital Kt = sYt 1 where s is the savings propensity. This implies that
growth is given by:
gt = log

Yt
L

  log

Yt 1
L

= [1 + t] t 1    log

Yt 1
L

:
This forges a link between policy making as it is a¤ected by institutions and behavior, and economic
growth.
This very simple model, combined with the discussion of political equilibria, give us the following
prediction about growth:
Core Growth Prediction Growth will be higher in a hereditary equilibrium only if executive con-
straints are weak.
We examine this prediction by looking at economic growth during the spell of leader ` in country
c who takes o¢ ce in year t. Specically, let gc`t be the average growth rate during the leader spell.
We then run regressions of the form:
g`ct = c + t + y`ct + 1`ct + 2`ct + 3 (`ct  `ct) + "`ct (1)
where c are country dummies, t are dummies for the years in which leaders take o¢ ce, y`ct is the
level of income per capita in the year that leader `s spell in o¢ ce begins, `ct is a dummy variable
which is equal to one if leader ` is a hereditary leader, and `ct is a dummy variable which is equal
to one if a country has strong executive constraints when the leader comes to power. We cluster the
standard errors at the country level.12
According to the core prediction of the theory, we should expect 1 > 0; 2 > 0 and 3 < 0 with
a core implication of the theory being that 1+3 = 0, i.e. having a dynastic leader generates better
performance only when executive constraints are weak.
The regression in (1) cannot be given a causal interpretation; our exercise is to study a specic
and non-trivial prediction for the data motivated by theory. By including year and country xed
e¤ects in each regression, the conditional correlation that we uncover controls for a range of country
characteristics and general global trends which could confound the argument that the theory focuses
on. And it is notable that we nd that estimates of 2 in equation (1) are not signicantly di¤erent
12This specication is fairly standard for a growth regression in panel data. The long time series (an average of
11 observations, i.e., leaders per country) means that the standard dynamic bias from including lagged income should
not be an issue.
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from zero in all of our specications after including country xed e¤ects. This does suggest that
xed country characteristics may be doing a decent job in conditioning out the relevant unobserved
heterogeneity associated with institutional di¤erences. But we caution against interpreting our
results as causal e¤ects.13
4 Evidence
We begin by presenting the core results on growth. We then assess their robustness and look at
supporting evidence from policy outcomes. We then look at whether growth a¤ects the probability
that countries stick with hereditary leaders.
Core Results The core results are in Table 3.
In column (1) we analyze the relationship between growth and having a hereditary leader in o¢ ce
using a specication which excludes lagged income as well as year and country dummies. This
shows a positive correlation between the growth rate and having a hereditary leader in o¢ ce, but
only if there are weak executive constraints. The F-test reported in the seventh row of the table,
tests the hypothesis that there is no e¤ect on growth from having a hereditary leader when executive
constraints are strong, i.e. 1 + 3 = 0 in (1). It shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that
there is no positive correlation with growth when a hereditary leader takes o¢ ce with strong executive
constraints. The size of the coe¢ cient suggests that in a country with weak executive constraints,
going from a non-hereditary leader to a hereditary leader increases the annual average economic
growth of the country by 1.03 percentage points per year. This is consistent with what we saw in
the raw data presented in Table 2.
In column (2) we allow for convergence by including the log of per capita income in the year
before a leaders spell begins. The positive correlation between growth and having a hereditary
leader in o¢ ce remains. The implied long-run e¤ect is similar in magnitude to the coe¢ cient in
column (1). Our core nding is also present in column (3) where we include year dummy variables to
capture global macro-economic shocks and trends. Column (4) adds country dummies which allow us
to control for time-invariant country characteristics. The size of the coe¢ cient on being a hereditary
leader is now larger and more strongly signicant. It is interesting to observe that the coe¢ cient on
strong executive constraints is not signicant once we include country dummies suggesting that xed
country characteristics account for much of the variation that determines institutional di¤erences.
In columns (5) and (6), we look at separate sub-samples according to the strength of executive
constraints. This allows separate year and country dummies to be estimated for each subgroup.
13The on-line Appendix reports the results of an empirical exercise where the gender composition of rst-born
children is used to predict successful hereditary transitions in monarchies. Since all monarchies have weak executive
constraints, this has a more limited link to the theory. The results show that whether the rst born is male is indeed
correlated with a successful hereditary transition.
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The nding is in line with the ndings of the previous columns with the only signicant correlation
being for hereditary leaders.
In column (7), we respond modestly to the concern that the process determining institutional
change in our data could be playing a direct role in the results. We have 87 institutional transitions
between strong and weak executive constraints in our data. In column (7), we drop the leaders
that come to o¢ ce following an institutional change, specically if there has been an institutional
change in the two years prior to them coming into o¢ ce. And we also those exclude where there
was an institutional change in the two years after they come into o¢ ce. This amounts to dropping
148 leaders and excludes the possibility that such reformistleaders are di¤erent in terms of their
capacity to generate growth. The results in column (7), which use the same specication as column
(4), estimated on this more restricted sample, conrm that dropping such reformist leaders does
not a¤ect the results.
Overall the correlations uncovered are consistent with the idea that if there are weak constraints
on the executive, then hereditary leaders tend to out-perform non-hereditary leaders. This is in line
with our core theoretical prediction which sees hereditary rule in this case as a manifestation of an
implicit relational contract.
Robustness In Table 4, we assess the robustness of these results to a variety of alternative speci-
cations and ways of looking at the data.
We rst assess whether the results in Table 3 are sensitive to the exact measure of hereditary
leadership that we use, considering broader and narrower alternatives. Column (1) focuses only on
leaders whose father was head of state, the most narrow denition of hereditary leadership. The core
results hold up in this case. Column (2) uses a less restrictive denition of hereditary leadership,
also classifying as hereditary those leaders whose uncle, brother, cousin, spouse, or brother-in-law
had been head of state. The coe¢ cient is somewhat smaller but still positive and signicant for the
case of weak executive constraints. Column (3) widens the core denition of hereditary leadership
in a di¤erent way by classifying leaders as hereditary if their parents or grandparents had held any
political position, not just being head of state. Again, the core results hold up.
In column (4) of Table 4, we include the age and tenure (in years) of leaders as additional controls.
This deals with a possible concern that hereditary leaders are di¤erent in other ways which is driving
their performance. Moreover, we have already seen from Table 2 that hereditary leaders tend to
spend a longer time in o¢ ce and are younger when they enter. There is a positive and signicant
correlation between the tenure of a leader and average economic growth during the leaders spell in
o¢ ce. However, there is no signicant correlation with the age at which the leader is selected. In
column (5), we include an interaction terms for age and tenure and also nd that the main nding
is robust.
Throughout Table 4, the core results from Table 3 remain the same with hereditary leaders being
associated with higher growth but only with weak executive constraints. But institutions such as
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executive constraints could be correlated with other variables which a¤ect economic performance.
One powerful and important hypothesis concerns the role of human capital in making democracy
sustainable. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that correlations between institutions and performance
are suspect when human capital levels are controlled for (Glaeser et al, 2007). Thus it is interesting
to explore this in our case. Due to the di¢ culty of obtaining reliable data on education at country
level for longer periods of time and a wide range of countries, we now focus on the period after
1960. Column (6) in Table 4 establishes that the core results are robust when we focus on the period
1960 onwards, although the correlation between growth and having a hereditary leader is somewhat
smaller. Column (7) includes the average years of education in the population over age 25 from the
Barro and Lee (2001) dataset as regressor. The coe¢ cient on education is not signicant (principally
due to the inclusion of country xed e¤ects). In all cases, the core nding of the paper is the same;
growth is higher when a hereditary leader holds o¢ ce and executive constraints are weak.
In Table 5, we show that the results are robust if we use time-invariant measures of executive
constraints. Specically, we show that the results are robust if we use the year in which the country
enters the sample (columns (1) through (3)) or the average level of executive constraints over the
whole time period for which the country is in the sample (columns (4) through (6)). This means that
time-varying shocks which drive institutional change are not driving the main nding. In column
(7) of Table 5, we use only the balanced sample of countries which are in the sample post 1965 and
use the average level of their executive constraints over this period as our time invariant measure.
The core nding from column (3) is also robust to this.
Policy Since we are positing that leaders a¤ect growth, we would expect leadership to matter via
a¤ecting the policies that are implemented during a leaders spell in power. In Table 6, we explore
this directly by focusing on some policies that could plausibly be thought to a¤ect growth.
One possibility is that productivity-enhancing investment decisions depend on the enforcement
of contracts and support for markets. If these are important for growth, as, for example, argued by
Hall and Jones (1999), we should expect a similar pattern of results when we use this as a dependent
variable. To investigate this, we look at the composite index of government anti-diversion policies
(GADP) as created from the International Country Risk Guide Date (ICRG) by Hall and Jones (1999)
and Knack and Keefer (1995) who use ve averages of these variables. We use an equally-weighted
average of ve variables: law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation, and
government repudiation of contracts, which is available between 1982 and 1997.14
The empirical specication that we use is:
GADP`ct = c + t + 1`ct + 2`ct + 3 (`ct  `ct) + "`ct (2)
14We normalize the variable to lie between zero and one with higher values representing more e¤ective policies to
support markets.
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for leader ` in country c beginning at date t, where: c are country dummies and t are year dummies.
To capture the leaders performance, we measure GADP`ct in the last year of the leaders time in
o¢ ce.15 As above, we cluster the standard errors by country.
The results are reported in Columns (1) and (2) in Table 6. In column (1) we include year and
country dummies, and in column (2) country dummies are replaced by region dummies. As with the
core results, there is a positive correlation between GADP`ct and a hereditary leader being in power
with weak executive constraints but there is no signicant correlation when executive constraints are
strong. Hence the pattern found for government anti-diversion policies parallels that found in data
on growth.16
Our second policy measure is intended to capture infrastructure quality using the data from the
Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) which are available between 1972 and 1990. Knack
and Keefer (1995) have shown that the BERI measures are strongly correlated with investment
and growth. The variable that we use tries to capture the quality of available facilities a¤ecting
communication and transportation in a country.17
The empirical specication that we use is:
IQ`ct = c + t + 1`ct + 2`ct + 3 (`ct  `ct) + "`ct (3)
for leader ` in country c beginning at date t, where: c are country dummies and t are year dummies.
We measure IQ`ct, the BERI infrastructure quality variable, during the last year of the leaders spell
in o¢ ce.18 We continue to cluster the standard errors by country.
The results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6. In column (3) we show that with
country and time dummy variables, there is a positive and signicant correlation between having an
hereditary leader in o¢ ce and infrastructure quality, but only when executive constraints are weak.
As with growth, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no correlation between IQ`ct when
executive constraints are strong. The ndings are broadly similar in column (4) of Table 6 where
we exploit only within-region variation.19
Does the survival of hereditary leaders depend on growth? We now test one dimension
of the mechanism emphasized by the theory, namely that hereditary power is dependent on good
15We chose this criterion so that we do not lose leaders whose spell in o¢ ce ends after 1995.
16We also attempted to update this variable to 2008. However, some of the variables in the original ICRG are
no longer reported. However, we can construct something which is fairly close; specically we take the average of
corruption, law and order, quality of bureaucracy and investment prole, normalized to lie between zero and one.
Expropriation risk and repudiation of contracts have been replaced in the later data by a new investment prole
variable. If we repeat the specications of columns (1) through (2) of Table 6, the results with country dummies are
weak, but with regional dummy variables, the results are similar to those in columns (1) and (2).
17 We normalize the measure to lie between zero and one with higher values representing better quality infrastructure.
18We chose this criterion so as not to lose from the sample those leaders whose spell in o¢ ce ends after 1990.
19Table A1, A2 and A3 in the appendix report results based on a range of di¤erent policy outcome varibles. However,
we do not nd signicant e¤ects of heteridary leadership.
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economic performance.20 For this purpose, we dene a regime in year t, rt, to be hereditary (rt = 1)
if a hereditary leader is in power in t and non-hereditary, (rt = 0) otherwise. We then estimate the
probability of an exit from a hereditary regime into a non-hereditary regime.
The empirical model that we use is as follows:
Prob (rt = 0 : rt 1 = 1) = (c + t + 1gct + 2zct) if rt 1 = 1 (4)
where  (:) is a standard normal distribution function, (c; t) are country and year dummies, gct
is the average growth rate over the previous ve years, and zct are other determinants of hereditary
leadership which we outline below. If growth a¤ects the probability of a succession, the coe¢ cient
on growth, 1, will be negative. It makes sense to study this using annual data since, unlike the
theoretical model, there is no xed date at which a leaders term comes to an end. In e¤ect,
this approach is modeling the hazard function associated with being in a hereditary regime and the
probability of exiting that regime.
Table 7 presents the results. Column (1) reports a negative association between the survival
of the hereditary regime and growth performance. The magnitude of this e¤ect suggests that a 1
percentage point increase in growth during the past ve years is associated with a 2.6 percentage
point fall in the probability of hereditary leadership coming to an end in any year. Since the
unconditional probability of this happening is 4.7%, this says that the probability of the hereditary
regime coming to an end in any given year increases by 50% when growth falls by 1 percentage point.
Column (2) conrms that this nding is driven by countries that have weak executive constraints; we
cannot reject that there is no relationship between the end of a hereditary regime and poor growth
performance for countries with strong executive constraints. The size of the e¤ect is marginally
larger in column (2) with a 2% increase in growth being associated with a 4.4% reduction in the
probability of a hereditary regime come to an end.
These results give credence to the idea that there is a performance-related component built into
the survival of hereditary regimes when executive constraints are weak. And this lines up with what
the theory postulates where continuity is predicated on good performance.21
20Our model does not predict when this might come to an end even if a country is in the hereditary equilibrium of
Proposition 2. However, it would be di¢ cult to modify the theory to have this possibility. One device would be to
invoke some kind of trembling handin equilibrium play with some leaders failing to deliver to choose good policies
even when it is in their interest to do so. Another possibility would to invoke competence shocks which impair the
ability of some hereditary leaders to deliver. In such cases, there will be low growth according to our model and
hereditary leaders will not succeed in passing on the o¢ ce to their o¤spring.
21Our model of hereditary leadership has multiple equilibria. Hence whether a hereditary leader emerges with
weak executive constraints is an equilibrium selection issue. In this world social conventions can play a coordinating
role and could plausibly be orthogonal to other factors which a¤ect growth, particularly once country xed-e¤ects are
included. In the on line Appendix, we report results based on two di¤erent IV approaches aimed at addressing the
concern that there are systematic factors which could a¤ect whether dynastic selection persists. The rst is to look at
exogenous shocks from natural disasters showing that these are correlated with dynastic selection. Second, we exploit
primogeniture conventions in monarchies. In both cases, we get robust results.
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5 Concluding Comments
This paper has looked at the role of hereditary rule in improving economic performance when other
controls  executive constrains on incumbents are absent. The logic that we have exploited is
essentially that put forward in Olson (1993) who emphasized that hereditary rule can provide a
means improving inter-temporal incentives in government. The centre piece of our paper is bringing
into use a new and unique dataset which identies whether leaders in countries between 1874 and
2004 were hereditary. In line with the core prediction of the theory, hereditary rule increases growth
but only when executive constraints are weak. Although we cannot be sure that this is a casual
e¤ect, it is a non-trivial prediction from a theoretical model and the nding holds up in the face of
a variety of robustness checks. Moreover the logic of the argument which has been developed by
Olson others, including Myerson (2008, 2010), has never, to our knowledge, been tested previously.
More generally, the analysis here contributes to our understanding of the heterogeneity of arrange-
ments which can sustain economic policy. Establishing hereditary succession is generally part of the
informal institutional arrangements relying on norms and conventions as much as formal constitu-
tional rules. It emphasizes the importance of drilling down into such details when looking at the
workings of political systems and how they relate to economic performance.
Although we have tried to understand the logic of hereditary rule, we do not regard the ndings
of the paper as necessarily making a case in favor of it. There are many arguments against such
rule, going back at least to Paine (1776). Such systems may well be inherently unjust by making
birthright a basis for inheriting political privileges. The fact that many polities around the world
have put an end to hereditary rule and establish strong executive constraints is no accident since this
is arguably a much more robust way to control leaders than relying on the chance that succession
incentives will safeguard the public interest. Moreover, if there are indeed multiple equilibria, then
what happens through this route could be a matter of a chance. By collecting a unique dataset
on the pattern of hereditary rule, we are able to go beyond the theory and illustrate empirically
the practical role of such intertemporal arrangements in circumventing the deciencies in formal
institutional arrangements.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:. Consider the rst case and suppose that e^ (s) 6= s, and all unpopular
leaders are removed from o¢ ce after one period: The value to the selectorate along the equilibrium
path is A+(1 )
A()+
1  . Let
W (x) = x+ 

A+ (1  ) A () + 
1  

:
Retaining popular incumbent yields W (A) : Deviating by removing such an incumbent makes the
selectorate worse o¤ since W (A) > W
 
A ()

. Now consider whether there could be a worthwhile
deviation by retaining an unpopular incumbent rather than picking a new incumbent at random.
This will not be the case either since W ( A) < W   A (). Hence there is no worthwhile one-shot
deviation for the selectorate. Since the probability that an incumbent is retained is independent of
, it is optimal for all incumbents to set e 6= s for all c > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2:. We rst show that it is optimal for the selectorate in such cases to retain
the o¤spring of leaders in this case if they produce  when the out-of-equilibrium beliefs are that
if the leader choose e 6= s, then there is an innite reversion to playing the benchmark equilibrium
where e 6= s for all leaders and only popular leaders are retained. In the benchmark equilibrium,
the payo¤ along the equilibrium is
A+ (1  ) A ()
1   .
In the proposed hereditary equilibrium, the payo¤ is:
A () + 
1   :
Suppose now that the incumbent leader has an unpopular o¤spring then retaining that individual is
optimal if
 A++ 
 A () + 
1  

 A () + 

A+ (1  ) A ()
1  

which reduces to the condition above. Clearly, if this condition holds, it will hold a fortiori if the
incumbents o¤spring is popular. This equilibrium exists as long as (1  )B  c . This is because
if the incumbent deviates to e 6= s, then his incumbent will be retained in o¢ ce with probability .
However, if he chooses e = s, then his o¤spring will hold o¢ ce for sure.
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